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According to the “democracy-as-value” hypothesis, democracy has become an ideological belief system providing social value
to democratic individuals, groups and institutions, granting legitimacy to their actions (even if dishonest or violent), and
protecting them from consecutive punishments. The present research investigates the extent to which this legitimizing process
is based on the individual endorsement of democratic principles. Across four experiments, following the misdeed of a (few) group
member(s), respondents who valued democratic group organization and democracy in general expressed more lenient retribu-
tive justice judgments towards democratic (as compared with nondemocratic) offender groups. These ﬁndings shed light on the
ways in which democratic ideology infuses justice judgments. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor in-
deed uniformly accepted, in the general climate of world
opinion, democratic governance has now achieved the sta-
tus of being taken to be generally right. (Sen, 1999, p. 3)
Democracy […] is often used as an elastic synonym for
good government, stretching to include whatever is
desirable in a state. (Post, 2006, p. 24)
In contemporary Western societies, democracy has ac-
quired an ideological aura that goes well beyond its original
signiﬁcance in terms of the direct political participation of
the members of a society. Democratic features such as every
citizen’s right to voice, freedom and equality are not simply
descriptive characteristics but are perceived as the morally
right way for a group to organize. Furthermore, there is also
a consensus among scholars from different ﬁelds that democ-
racy cannot be reduced to a set of procedures but implies the
respect of certain values (Bonvin, 2005; Brettschneider,
2006; Post, 2006; Sen, 1999). As a result, “people are embrac-
ing democracy not only as a system of government, but also as
a value” (McFaul, 2004, p. 152). As a consequence, it is likely
that the value ascribed to the democratic political system in-
fuses judgments related to actions carried out by democratic
groups, leading to perceptions of a higher legitimacy of those
actions (no matter their moral nature)—this is the general idea
we tackle in this research.
Evidence for this reasoning comes from research based on
the democracy-as-value hypothesis, which states that*Correspondence to: Andrea Pereira, VU University Amsterdam, Van der Boech
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Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.democracy constitutes an ideological belief system providing
in and by itself value to democratic actors and legitimacy to
their actions (Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, Staerklé, & Butera,
2012; Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, Pereira, & Butera, 2012).
A series of empirical studies has shown that intergroup aggres-
sions and military interventions were perceived as less illegiti-
mate when the offenders belong to a democratic group, rather
than a nondemocratic one, speciﬁcally when the victim group
was nondemocratic (Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, Depuiset, &
Butera, 2005; see also Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, et al.,
2012). Furthermore, this pattern of ﬁndings was replicated
on the support for the collective punishment of the offender
group: the collective punishment of a democratic group whose
victim was nondemocratic was less acceptable than all other
combinations of aggressor and victim groups (Falomir-
Pichastor, Staerklé, Depuiset, & Butera, 2007; see also
Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, et al., 2012). These results indicate
that not only does democracy provide legitimacy to wrongful
actions such as aggressive and belligerent acts, it also protects
democratic offender groups from punishment. Furthermore,
this effect was mediated by the offender group’s perceived
moral value (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007), supporting the
suggestion that democratic groups are more valued than non-
democratic ones and that this value provides legitimacy to
their wrongful behaviors.
Although these ﬁndings provide consistent support for the
democracy-as-value hypothesis, the crucial role of the value
ascribed to democracy as a general principle remains largely
unexplored. Speciﬁcally, in order to demonstrate that democ-
racy acts as a value people strive to defend through theirorststraat 1, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
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192 Andrea Pereira et al.retributive judgments, it should be clearly established that such
effects are driven by the individual’s attribution of social and
moral value to democracy. That said, to date, no study has dem-
onstrated the central role of one’s personal valorization of de-
mocracy per se in these effects. While previous ﬁndings
showed that democratic offender groups were overall perceived
as being endowed with greater moral value (Falomir-Pichastor
et al., 2007), the present research focuses on the individual-level
antecedents of this positive valence. Thus, we want to demon-
strate that when people think highly of a democratic offender
group, they do so because they value democracy as a general
principle that infuses perceptions and judgments of both demo-
cratic and nondemocratic groups. In sum, the present research
aimed at testing the central idea that the effect of a group’s politi-
cal organization on retributive justice judgments is fueled by the
value people ascribe to democracy as such.DEMOCRACY AS A VALUEIn the present research, we argue that the protective and legiti-
mizing power of democracy comes from its intrinsic value and
that democracy is a value in itself. If democracy is a value,
then the processes speciﬁc to the upholding of values should
apply to the concept of democracy just as they apply to other
values. For instance, it is to be expected that the endorsement
of the value of democracy should shape judgments related to
democratic actors and actions.
This expectation is rooted in research indicating that
justice judgments are affected by the values observers endorse
(e.g., Green, Staerklé, & Sears, 2006; Pefﬂey, Hurwitz, &
Sniderman, 1997; Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997). For instance,
judgments of deservingness and punishments are shaped by
the perception of the target’s morality, which is inferred from
the consistency between the target’s behavior and the per-
ceiver’s values (Feather, 1996, 1999). Moreover, wrongdoings
that do not clash with one’s values are judged with leniency,
whereas those that do are harshly judged. These effects are
the result of a judgmental value expression, a process accord-
ing to which values are able to serve as references in the nor-
mative evaluation of behaviors and outcomes (Henry &
Reyna, 2007). Moreover, these effects are in line with the jus-
tice motive theory (Lerner, 1977) and the perceptual theory of
legitimacy (Crandall & Beasley, 2001) according to which
people attempt to establish balanced structures between the
characteristics of a situation—such as perpetrators, victims
and outcomes—and justice judgments. Hence, the value of de-
mocracy may serve as a benchmark in judgments related to
democratic and nondemocratic groups: The former should be
perceived as upholding the value of democracy, whereas the
latter should be seen as violating it (Staerklé, 2009), and the
subsequent judgments should be in line with these perceptions
(Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2005, 2007). As a result, we should
expect retributive judgments following the observation of a
wrongdoing to be polarized such that democratic groups
should be punished with leniency, while nondemocratic
groups should be punished more severely.
That being said, research on expectancy-violation theory
(Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987) and the subjective groupCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.dynamics model (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001) would
lead to opposite expectations. Indeed, according to these theo-
ries, judgments regarding democratic perpetrator groups
should actually be harsher than those of nondemocratic
groups, because democratic offending groups would have vio-
lated the higher expectations to which they are held or because
their misbehavior represents a greater threat to democratic
norms. However, other studies have shown that harsher judg-
ments towards valued perpetrators occur only when the circum-
stances of the misdeed do not allow perceivers to minimize its
severity. For instance, it has been shown that more lenient judg-
ments towards valued perpetrators are supported as long as it is
possible to do so (van Prooijen, 2006, 2010), and in the case of
(non)democratic offending groups, it appears that democratic
groups are only inﬂicted harsher punishments when their col-
lective responsibility is outlined and made clear (Pereira,
Berent, Falomir-Pichastor, Staerklé, & Butera, 2015). Given
that the present research focuses on situations that allow for
the minimization of the wrongdoing (following Falomir-
Pichastor et al., 2005, 2007), we expect the leniency rather than
the expectancy-violation effect to emerge.
May it be a leniency or a harshness effect, in order for a
value to shape one’s retributive judgments, it is necessary that
one endorses this value personally. Indeed, even though they
are likely to be widely shared, values are not absolute and
are endorsed to different degrees by different people. For this
reason, a relative leniency towards democratic groups and
greater punitiveness towards nondemocratic groups should
be observed mainly among people who personally endorse
the value of democracy. Conversely, such effects should be re-
duced among people who attach less importance to democracy
as a value, because this distinction based on the group’s orga-
nization is less likely to emerge. By investigating this modera-
tion for the ﬁrst time, the present research provides a better
understanding of the processes underlying the effect of the po-
litical organization of perpetrator groups on judgments of col-
lective punishment, arguing that it is the valorization of
democracy as a general value that infuses such judgments.OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESISIf it is indeed the value of democracy that drives justice judg-
ments, we can hypothesize that one’s valorization of democ-
racy should moderate the effect of an offender group’s
political organization on justice judgments. Speciﬁcally, when
it comes to support for collective punishment, we predict that
the judgmental bias in favor of democratic groups (or in disfa-
vor of nondemocratic ones) should increase along with peo-
ple’s valorization of democracy.
Four studies were carried out in order to examine the nature
of the processes underlying the legitimizing function of de-
mocracy by attempting to demonstrate the crucial role of the
endorsement of democracy as a value. In all four studies, par-
ticipants were presented with an offense committed by one (or
a few) member(s) of a given group and subsequently had to in-
dicate the extent to which they would support the punishment
of the entire group. The political organization of the perpetra-
tor group was manipulated in all studies. Following priorEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 45, 191–203 (2015)
Democracy as a value 193research (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2005; 2007), we chose to
focus our conceptualization of democracy on two key proce-
dural features of a democratic organization: free elections of
group leaders and the collective deliberative process. The
valorization of democracy was measured as an individual
difference variable. Given that values reﬂect beliefs and
preferences about desirable modes of conduct (Maio & Olson,
1994; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz,
1992), valorization of democracy should indeed lead to a pref-
erence for a democratic group organization over a nondemo-
cratic one in actual intergroup contexts. Furthermore, in
order to make valorization of democracy as concrete as possi-
ble for respondents and to restrict its measurement to the main
dimension of concern here (namely group organization), it was
assessedwith a proximalmeasure of preference for (non)democratic
group organization in Studies 1–3. In order to show that the effects
under studywere equally dependent onmore abstract ideals, a distal
and more traditional measure of valorization of democracy as a
political system was used in Study 4.
In order to provide external validity to our ﬁndings, differ-
ent offenses (i.e., vandalism and student plagiarism) and mea-
sures of the central constructs (valorization of democracy and
support for collective punishment) were used throughout the
experiments. Moreover, the offenses targeted a victim group
whose political organization was either controlled (Study 1)
or manipulated (Study 2), or the offense did not involve any
identiﬁable victim (in Studies 3 and 4). Finally, we ran Study
5 in which we conducted aggregated analyses on the data from
Studies 1 to 4 in order to test for the overall signiﬁcance of the
effect of valorization of democracy on the support for the
collective punishment of democratic and nondemocratic
offender groups.STUDY 1In Study 1, participants were presented with a vignette
depicting an act of vandalism committed by some members
of one (offender) group against members of another (victim)
group. We manipulated the offender group political organiza-
tion (democratic or nondemocratic) and measured respon-
dents’ preference for democratic group organizations in
general (i.e., not towards any speciﬁc group) as well as their
support for the collective punishment of that offender group.
We expected the effect of the offender group political organi-
zation on support for collective punishment to be moderated
by participants’ preference for democratic group organization.
More speciﬁcally, the collective punishment of the democratic
group was expected to be less supported than that of the non-
democratic group, but only when preference for democratic or-
ganization is higher rather than lower.
Method
Participants
Participants were 45 young adults recruited by email in a
Swiss Scout association. This population was chosen because
their activity as scouts was likely to make them perceive theCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.scenario describing a summer camp as relevant to them. Fur-
thermore, their organization is rather hierarchical as they deal
with at least four levels of appointed (i.e., not elected) leaders.
Their age ranged from 16 to 40 years (M=22.18, SD=5.35),
and 17 of them were female. Participants voluntarily followed
a link to an online questionnaire (sent by email, directly by the
head of the association). At the end of the study, they were
thanked, debriefed and asked to send in their data if they
agreed that they be used for research purposes. In this study,
as in the following ones, preliminary analyses showed that
gender did not interact with the main independent variables
and was therefore dropped from subsequent analyses.
Procedure
The procedure was adapted from Falomir-Pichastor and col-
leagues’ studies (2005, 2007). The alleged purpose of the
study was to examine participants’ opinions, as members of
a Scout association, about an incident that had allegedly taken
place in a Scout camp. Before being informed about the inci-
dent, participants read that researchers had observed adoles-
cents in summer camps in order to study patterns of group
organizations and had identiﬁed two main types of group orga-
nization: nondemocratic and democratic. The nondemocratic
organization (labeled hierarchical) was described as follows:
a few members of the group proclaimed themselves as leaders,
took important decisions for the group without consulting the
other members and therefore had more power than other mem-
bers. The description of democratic organization (labeled
egalitarian) stated that group leaders were collectively chosen
by all group members, decisions were taken in assemblies in
which all members participated, and therefore the group
leaders and other members had equal power.
Participants were then informed that an incident had oc-
curred in one of those summer camps, where two Scout groups
camped not far from each other: During an excursion, adoles-
cents of one camp encountered participants from the other
camp and made fun of them. A few days later, two members
of the mocked camp (the offender group) went to the other
camp (the victim group) and sprayed grafﬁti on their tents,
damaged their installations, insulted a member of the camp
and stole food from their stockroom. The culprits, hooded,
could not be identiﬁed, but it was very clear that they belonged
to the other camp. Participants where then asked to report the
extent to which they supported the collective punishment of
the entire offender group.
Independent Variables
Preference for democratic group organization. Partici-
pants’ preference for democratic group organization was
assessed after the description of each group organization type
(i.e., right before the manipulation of the offender group orga-
nization and the description of the incident, such as their
judgments were not inﬂuenced by what they were told about
a speciﬁc group of scouts). On a bipolar scale (1= egalitarian,
7 =hierarchical), they had to indicate which one of the two
types of groups was (1) fairer, (2) more efﬁcient, (3) the
one whose members were happier and (4) the one they pre-
ferred themselves. After appropriate recoding, these four itemsEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 45, 191–203 (2015)
Figure 1. Support for collective punishment as a function of offender
group organization and respondents’ preference for democratic group
organization (+/1SD) (Study 1, summer camp paradigm)
194 Andrea Pereira et al.were averaged into a score of preference for democratic group
organization (M=4.77, SD=1.21; α= .71).
Offender group political organization. Offender group
organization was manipulated at the moment the intergroup
aggression was described. Participants were told that the of-
fender group was either egalitarian or hierarchical, depending
on the experimental condition. For the sake of simplicity, the
organization of the victim group was opposed to that of the ag-
gressor group in this study (i.e., when the aggressor group was
egalitarian, the victim group was told to be hierarchical, and
vice versa).
Dependent Variable
Support for collective punishment. Participants were told
that because the culprits could not be identiﬁed, the camp or-
ganizers considered the possibility of a collective punishment
in order to restore justice. Support for collective punishment
was measured with ﬁve items after the description of the ag-
gression: All members should (1) repair the inﬂicted damages
(e.g., give back all stolen food or do some work to repair the
damages in the victim camp), (2) publicly apologize, (3) be ex-
pelled from the camp before it ends, (4) be woken up earlier in
the morning and (5) be deprived of pleasant activities (1 = en-
tirely disagree; 7 = entirely agree). These ﬁve items were ag-
gregated in a score of support for collective punishment
(M=3.58, SD=1.09; α= .58).
Results
Scores of collective punishment were regressed on the of-
fender group organization (conditions coded as follows:
democratic =1 and nondemocratic =+1), preference for
democratic group organization (standardized continuous score)
and the two-way interaction term. The overall model was
marginally signiﬁcant, F(3, 41) =2.84, p= .05, R2 = .17, and
the predicted two-way interaction was signiﬁcant, β1 = .36,
t(41) =2.54, p= .015 (see Figure 1). At low scores of preference
for democratic group organization (i.e., one standard deviation
below the mean), participants punished democratic and non-
democratic groups to the same extent, β=.21, t(41)=0.99,
p= .33, whereas at high scores of preference for democratic
group organization (i.e., one standard deviation above the
mean), participants punished the nondemocratic group signiﬁ-
cantly more than the democratic group, β= .61, t(41)=2.73,
p= .009. Although no hypothesis was made about this effect, it
should be also noted that as preference for democratic group
organization increased, support for the punishment of the
nondemocratic group increased, β= .55, t(41) =2.55, p= .015.
No other effect reached signiﬁcance.
Discussion
The interaction effect between participants’ preference for de-
mocracy and offender group political organization provides
empirical support for our reasoning. Respondents with a1βs refer to standardized coefﬁcients throughout all experiments.
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.relatively high preference for democratic group organization
supported the punishment of the nondemocratic group signiﬁ-
cantly more than that of the democratic one, while support for
collective punishment among respondents with a lower prefer-
ence for democratic group organization did not vary as a func-
tion of the political organization of the offender group.
Interestingly, these ﬁndings were evidenced with members
of a scout association, that is, a hierarchical organization. This
suggests that even after being reminded of one’s belonging to
a hierarchical structure, one might still value democratic pro-
cedures. Hence, membership in democratic or nondemocratic
structures does not seem to exert a great inﬂuence on the as-
cription of value to democracy, which illustrates just how
widely democracy is valued. In order to generalize these ﬁnd-
ings, Study 2 focuses on a different population where the
same, if not a higher, valorization of democracy is expected:
university students.
Moreover, it should be mentioned that ﬁndings from Study
1 were observed in a scenario where the political organization
of the victim group was always opposite to that of the offender
group. This is a methodological limitation, given that the of-
fender and victim group organization co-vary and might there-
fore be confounded. Furthermore, past research showed that
the effect of the offender political organization appeared
speciﬁcally in antagonistic intergroup contexts where the
victim group was nondemocratic (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2005,
2007), suggesting that no leniency towards democratic offender
groups should appear when the victim is another democratic
group. Thus, Study 2 aimed at replicating and extending these
ﬁndings by showing that one’s preference for democracy modera-
tes the effect of the offender political organization and that this
pattern should speciﬁcally appear when the victim group is
nondemocratic rather than democratic.STUDY 2In order to address the limitations of Study 1 and increase the
external validity of these ﬁndings, Study 2 used a different para-
digm involving a case of plagiarism allegedly occurring in aEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 45, 191–203 (2015)
2In this study, we changed the way we computed preference for democratic
group organization to show that our effect was not measure dependent. The
weak reliability is due to the independent assessment of preference for egalitar-
ian and hierarchical groups. Because separate analyses using either egalitarian
or hierarchical items showed a similar pattern of ﬁndings, we decided to de-
scribe results for the overall score. Although the results were perfectly repli-
cated with this measure, we returned in Study 3 to the previous measure that
yielded higher reliability. The fourth item assessing which group organization
type participants themselves preferred was not included in this study because
of the independent measurement of each item replacing the bipolar one used
in Study 1.
Democracy as a value 195university class. The experimental design comprised a manipu-
lation of the offender group political organization (demo-
cratic, nondemocratic), of the victim group political
organization (democratic, nondemocratic) and a measure of
preference for democratic group organization. The main de-
pendent measure was again support for collective punishment.
We predicted a three-way interaction effect, whereby prefer-
ence for democratic group organization would moderate the
effect of group organization: When preference for democratic
groups is high rather than low, collective punishment of the
democratic perpetrator group should be more lenient than
punishment of the nondemocratic group, in particular when
the victim group is nondemocratic rather than democratic.
Method
Participants
Eighty-six undergraduate students in social sciences or psy-
chology of a large Swiss University volunteered in this study,
among which 60 were female. Their age ranged from 17 to
41 years (M=20.85, SD=3.13). Participants were invited to
answer a written questionnaire at the beginning of a class
and were thereafter thanked and debriefed.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to the one described in Study 1 but
was adapted to a case of plagiarism that was likely to be more
relevant to a student population. The alleged purpose of the
study was to examine students’ opinions about a case of pla-
giarism that supposedly took place during a university class.
Before describing the plagiarism, participants were anecdot-
ally informed that the professor of this seminar was interested
in the way students organize their workgroups in order to ac-
complish their tasks and that scientiﬁc studies had identiﬁed
two main types of group organization. The nondemocratic or-
ganization (labeled hierarchical) was described as follows:
One of the students is a self-proclaimed leader who assigns
tasks to the other members, coordinates the work of the group
and takes the decisions when members disagree. The descrip-
tion of democratic organization (labeled egalitarian) stated
that students discuss over the best ways to accomplish the
tasks; one of the students is collectively chosen to lead the
group and guide the discussion when members disagree.
Participants were then informed about the plagiarism case.
It allegedly occurred during a class in which students worked
in groups to write up a collective assignment. As the end of
the term approached, a group member, in charge of the assign-
ment’s ﬁnalization, tried to enhance his group’s chances of
success. He stole a USB key from a member of another group
and copied important sections of the other group’s work.
Thereafter, all students turned their assignment in.
Independent Variables
Preference for democratic group organization. Partici-
pants’ preference for democratic group organization was
assessed immediately after the description of the group organiza-
tions (i.e., before learning about the plagiarism case). ForCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.egalitarian and hierarchical groups, participants were separately
asked the extent to which the group functioning was (1)
fair, (2) efﬁcient and (3) satisﬁed its members (1=not at all,
7 =absolutely). The order in which the two group organizations
were evaluated was counterbalanced. A score of preference for
democratic group organization was computed by averaging the
scores for the six items after reversing those for the hierarchical
items (M=4.63, SD=0.61; α= .49).2
Political organization of the offender and the victim
group. At the moment the plagiarism case was described,
participants read that the plagiarist group was either egalitar-
ian or hierarchical and that the victim group was either egal-
itarian or hierarchical.Dependent Variable
Support for collective punishment. Support for collective
punishment was assessed through a single item: “Beyond the
punishment applied to the plagiarist, to what extent should
the entire group be punished?” ranging from 1 (not punished
at all) to 7 (harshly punished; M=3.08, SD=1.46).Results
Scores for collective punishment were regressed on offender
group political organization (1=democratic and +1=non-
democratic), victim group political organization (1=demo-
cratic and +1=nondemocratic), preference for democratic
group organization (standardized continuous score), the three
two-way interaction terms and the three-way interaction term
as predictor variables. The overall model for support for col-
lective punishment was signiﬁcant, F(7, 85) = 2.39, p= .029,
R2 = .18. As expected, the three-way interaction was signiﬁ-
cant, β= .28, t(85) = 2.73, p= .008 (see Figure 2). The offender
group organization by preference for democratic group organi-
zation interaction was not signiﬁcant when the victim was
democratic, β=.08, t(85) =0.81, p= .42, but this interac-
tion was signiﬁcant when the victim was nondemocratic,
β= .31, t(85) = 3.00, p= .004. In this latter case, the effect of
offender group political organization was non-signiﬁcant at
low levels of preference for democratic group organization
(1SD), β= .25, t(85) = 1.09, p= .28, but at high levels of
preference (+1SD), the democratic offender group was
punished signiﬁcantly less severely than the nondemocratic
group, β=.68, t(85) = 3.38, p= .001. Furthermore, as
preference for democratic organization increased, support for
collective punishment of the nondemocratic group increased
as well (β= .68, t (85) = 3.03, p= .003). No other effects
reached signiﬁcance.Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 45, 191–203 (2015)
Figure 2. Support for collective punishment as a function of offender group organization, victim group organization and respondents’ prefer-
ence for democratic group organization (+/1SD) (Study 2, plagiarism paradigm)
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Results support the predicted moderation: Collective punish-
ment was lower when the offender group was democratic
rather than nondemocratic. Further, this effect only emerged
when the victim group was nondemocratic and among partici-
pants whose preference for democratic group organization was
relatively high. These ﬁndings both replicate and extend those
of Study 1. Contributing to the external validity of the ﬁnd-
ings, this study used a different wrongdoing (i.e., an act of pla-
giarism) and different measures of preference for democratic
group organization and of collective punishment. Overall, the
results from Studies 1 and 2 support our hypothesis that pref-
erence for democracy is a key moderator of the effect of politi-
cal group organization on judgments of collective punishment
following an offense.
Yet, there is still the possibility that the hypothesized effect
is conditional on the victim political organization: Democratic
groups were only protected from punishment when they vic-
timized a nondemocratic group, that is, in the case of an oppo-
sition between the offender (valued) and victim (devalued)
groups. However, it is also plausible that it is the presence of
a democratic victim group that precludes a democratic of-
fender’s misdeed from being condoned rather than the pres-
ence of a nondemocratic victim group. In order to rule out
the possibility that a nondemocratic victim group is necessary
for a democratic offender group to be punished with more le-
niency than a nondemocratic offender group, Study 3 pre-
sented participants with an offense that was not perpetrated
at the expense of any victim group.STUDY 3This study used a simpliﬁed version of the plagiarism para-
digm that did not involve any victim group, allowing a simpler
and more direct test of the effect of the offender group organi-
zation. As in Study 2, participants were informed about a pla-
giarism committed by a student belonging to a working group
in a university seminar. However, they were this time told thatCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the plagiarizer copied an article found on the Internet (rather
than stolen from another group; see Study 2), and we merely
manipulated the offender group organization (democratic,
nondemocratic). As in previous studies, preference for demo-
cratic group organization was measured and used as a moder-
ator. Support for collective punishment was again our
dependent measure.Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 44 students approached on the campus of a
large Swiss university, asked to volunteer in completing a
written questionnaire, and thereafter thanked and debriefed.
Twenty of them were female. Their ages ranged from 18 to
30 years (M=21.98, SD=2.22). The procedure was similar
to that of Study 2, with the exception that there was no victim
group (the plagiarizer copied an article found on the Internet).Independent Variables
Preference for democratic group organization. Partici-
pants’ preference for democratic group organization was
assessed directly after the descriptions of the two types of groups
with the same four bipolar items used in Study 1 (i.e., they indi-
cated which group is fairer, more efﬁcient, has happier members
and the one they prefer) averaged into a score of preference for
democratic group organization (M=4.96, SD=1.15; α= .67;
1= egalitarian, 7=hierarchical).
Offender group political organization. The manipulation
of the offender group organization was similar to the one used
in the two previous studies.Dependent Variable
Support for collective punishment was measured as in Study 2
(M=3.5, SD=1.77).Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 45, 191–203 (2015)
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Support for collective punishment was regressed on offender
group organization (1=democratic and +1=nondemo-
ocratic), preference for democratic organization (standardized
continuous scores) and the two-way interaction term. The
overall model was signiﬁcant, F(3, 40) = 3.02, p= .041,
R2 = .19. The predicted two-way interaction was signiﬁcant,
β=.34, t(40) =2.10, p= .042, indicating that preference
for democratic group organization moderated the effect of
the offender group organization (see Figure 3). The effect of
group organization was not signiﬁcant at low conditional
levels of preference for democratic group organization
(1SD), β=.10, t(40) =0.47, p= .64, whereas the demo-
cratic group was signiﬁcantly less punished than the nondem-
ocratic group at high conditional levels of preference for
democratic organization (+1SD), β=.58, t(40) =2.65,
p= .012. Additionally, as preference for democratic organiza-
tion increased, so did the support for collective punishment
of the nondemocratic group, β= .36, t(40) = 2.14, p= .038.
No other effect reached signiﬁcance.
Discussion
Study 3 tested and conﬁrmed the moderating effect of respon-
dents’ preference for democracy on the effect of offender
group political organization on support for collective punish-
ment. Given that this effect was observed following a wrong-
doing that did not involve any victim group, one should
conclude that the moderating effect of the victim group’s or-
ganization observed in Study 2 as well as in previous re-
search (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2005; 2007) is not simply
due to the opposition in political organizations of the of-
fender and the victim groups. Put in other words, the le-
niency effect towards democratic groups does not require a
nondemocratic victim to emerge; rather, it is inhibited when
the victim group is democratic. More importantly, these ef-
fects support our reasoning according to which democratic
groups trigger less severe retributive judgments than non-
democratic groups, because these groups uphold the valueFigure 3. Support for collective punishment as a function of of-
fender group organization and respondents’ preference for democratic
group organization (+/1SD) (Study 3, plagiarism paradigm)
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.of democracy that people are motivated to protect. As a mat-
ter of fact, Studies 1 to 3 indicate that this protection pro-
cess occurs speciﬁcally for people with a strong preference
for democratic group organization.STUDY 4Study 4 essentially aimed at addressing various methodological
and theoretical issues that might still weaken the conclusions that
could be drawn from Studies 1 to 3. First, it should be noted that
the measure of preference for democracy used in Studies 1
through 3 was designed to speciﬁcally assess the dimension of de-
mocracy that is at the heart of our hypothesis, namely democratic
or nondemocratic “group organization”. Nevertheless, in order to
ascertain that it is valorization of democracy as a general concept
that is driving our results, it appears necessary to replicate the ﬁnd-
ings with a different dimension of democracy. Thus, Study 4
aimed at replicating ﬁndings of Study 3 with another measure of
valorization of democracy that would assess participants’ attitudes
towards democracy as a political system rather than as group or-
ganization, targeting a more general dimension of democracy.
Second, Study 4 was run to make sure there was no reliabil-
ity issue with the measures of collective punishment used in
Studies 2 and 3. Indeed, in those studies, we used a 1-item
measure of support for collective punishment, whereas we
used a multi-item scale in Study 1. Even though single-item
measures have proven to provide sufﬁcient validity and reli-
ability in other studies on punishment (Strelan & van Prooijen,
2013), Study 4 contained both a 1-item and a multi-item mea-
sure of support for collective punishment adapted to the pres-
ent paradigm to address this potential issue.
Finally, Study 4 was also designed to rule out the possibil-
ity that the effects of group organization were driven by the
fact that within both types of groups, individuals have (a)
symetric power relations. Indeed, on comparison with non-
democratic types of organization, a democratic organization
necessarily implies a more egalitarian distribution of power.
Moreover, and despite the existence of several forms of
democracy and the complexity of the concept, a minimal oper-
ational deﬁnition of democracy can be a form of governance in
which political power is held by the people under a free
participative system (e.g., Dahl, Shapiro, & Cheibub, 2003;
Tyler & Mitchell, 1994). Thus, one might argue that the
greater power from which democratic group members beneﬁt
is partly responsible for the higher valorization of democracy
and that the results observed previously could be explained
by this single characteristic of democracy. In order to test this
alternative explanation and to rule this issue out, Study 4 included
a measure of the perception of the power held by group members
as a possible mediator of the moderation effect.
Method
Participants
Participants were 137 registered students from a large Swiss
university recruited through email and invited to follow a link
to an online study (3000 emails were sent to university studentEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 45, 191–203 (2015)
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which 137 completed the study, resulting in a 4.5% response
rate). At the end of the study, they were thanked, debriefed
and asked to send in their data if they agreed that they be used
for research purposes. Their age ranged from 17 to 53 years
(M=23.75, SD=5.66), and 105 of them were female.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Study 3, with the exception
that participants were ﬁrst invited to answer a general scale of
valorization of democracy before being presented with the
case of plagiarism.
Independent Variables
Valorization of democracy. Four items measured partici-
pants’ valorization of democracy on a 1 to 7 scale (1= not at
all, 7 = absolutely): (1) I prefer democracy over other forms
of government; (2) the parliamentary system is my favorite po-
litical system; (3) I value democracy as a political system; and
(4) I ascribe value to democracy as a political system
(M=5.75, SD=0.87; α= .77).
Offender group political organization. The manipulation
of the offender group organization was similar to the one used
in previous studies.
Dependent Variables
Support for collective punishment. Support for collective
punishment was measured in two ways: A ﬁrst general item,
identical to the one used in Studies 2 and 3, asked the extent
to which the entire group should be punished one way or an-
other regardless of the plagiarist’s punishment (M=3.28,
SD=1.81; 1 = not punished at all, 7 = harshly punished). A
9-item scale then asked to what extent different types of pun-
ishment should be inﬂicted upon the group: (1) apologize toFigure 4. (a and b) Support for collective punishment (single-item meas
and respondents’ valorization of democracy (+/1SD) (Study 4, plagiar
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the professor; (2) assist the professor with different administra-
tive tasks; (3) help ﬁrst-year students with their assignments;
(4) pay a ﬁnancial compensation to the university; (5) rewrite
the assignment; (6) write an additional assignment; (7) fail
the seminar; (8) fail all exams from that exam session; and
(9) be expelled from the university (M=3.34, SD=0.99;
α= .74; 1 = not at all, 7 = absolutely). The two measures corre-
lated at r(135) = .72, p< .001.
Perceived group member power. Perceived group mem-
ber power was assessed with three items: To what extent do
you consider that the members of this group (1) had power
over the group’s actions, (2) could inﬂuence the group’s deci-
sions and (3) had power over the group’s decisions (M=4.75,
SD=1.49; α= .91; 1= not at all, 7 = absolutely).Results
Single-item and multiple-item scores for collective punish-
ment, as well as perceived group member power, were all three
and separately regressed on offender group political organiza-
tion (1=democratic and +1=nondemocratic), valorization
of democracy (standardized continuous score) and the two-
way interaction terms.
On the single-item measure, the overall model for support
for collective punishment was signiﬁcant, F(3, 133) = 5.36,
p= .002, R2 = .11. The offender group organization showed
no signiﬁcant main effect (p= .44), but the valorization of
democracy did: The more participants valued democracy,
the less they supported collective punishment, β=.23,
t(133) =2.80, p= .006. This effect was qualiﬁed by the
predicted interaction with the offender group organization,
β= .25, t(133) = 3.08, p= .003 (see Figure 4a): At low scores
of valorization of democracy (1SD), democratic and
nondemocratic groups were punished to the same extent,
β=.19, t(133) =1.64, p= .103, but at high scores of
valorization of democracy (+1SD), democratic groups
were less punished than nondemocratic groups, β=32,ure and multi-items scale) as a function of offender group organization
ism paradigm)
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Democracy as a value 199t(133) = 2.73, p= .007. Additionally, support for collective
punishment of democratic groups decreased as valorization
of democracy increased, β=.49, t(133) =3.08, p< .001.
These results are consistent with those observed on the 9-item
measure of collective punishment. Indeed, the overall model
was signiﬁcant, F(3, 133)=7.22, p< .001, R2 = .14, no main ef-
fect of the group political organization was found (p= .76), and
valorization of democracy decreased support for collective pun-
ishment, β=.33, t(133)=4.08, p< .001. The two-way inter-
action was also signiﬁcant, β= .21, t(133)=2.6, p= .010 (see
Figure 4b): At low scores of valorization of democracy
(1SD), democratic groups were more punished than nondemo-
cratic groups, β=.24, t(133)=2.07, p= .041, but at high
scores of valorization of democracy (+1SD), democratic groups
were less punished than nondemocratic groups, although the ef-
fect did not reach the conventional level of signiﬁcance, β= .19,
t(133)=1.63, p= .106. In addition, as valorization of democracy
increased, support for collective punishment of democratic
groups decreased, β=.54, t(133)=4.49, p< .001.
Regarding perceived groupmember power, the overall model
was signiﬁcant, F(3, 133)=5.34, p= .002, R2 = .11. Both main
effects were signiﬁcant: Members of democratic groups were
perceived as having more power within the group as compared
with nondemocratic group members, β=.30, t(133)=3.52,
p= .001, and the perception of group members’ power increased
along with participants’ valorization of democracy, β= .16, t
(133)=1.98, p= .049. However, the interaction between of-
fender group organization and valorization of democracy was
non-signiﬁcant (p= .69), which precludes the test of the media-
tor role of this variable in the interaction observed on collective
punishment (e.g., Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005).
Discussion
Results of Study 4 reliably replicated ﬁndings from previous
studies, showing that democratic perpetrator groups are judged
with more leniency than nondemocratic groups by evaluators
who highly value democracy. This difference no longer
emerges for those who attach less importance to democracy.
Moreover, this was shown to be the case while using a differ-
ent measure of valorization of democracy (targeting the con-
cept more directly than was done in previous studies), as
well as two different measures of collective punishment (sin-
gle-item and multi-item scales). Indeed, valorization of de-
mocracy was again found to moderate the effect of group
organization on collective punishment, and even though one
of the effects we expected was just short of signiﬁcance onTable 1. Effect sizes and inverse variance weights of the effect of va
groups, Studies 1 through 4 (Study 5)
Democratic
Effect size Inverse varia
Study 1 .21 22
Study 2 .21 40
Study 3 .29 14
Study 4—single item .48 63
Studies 4–9—item scale .53 63
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.the multi-item scale of collective punishment, the pattern of
ﬁndings of previous studies was nevertheless conﬁrmed on
both measures. All in all, these results add to the reliability
and replicability of the difference consistently observed in
Studies 1 to 3 (Cohen, 1994).
Furthermore, in order to exclude an alternative explanation of
the present results in terms of asymmetric power relations within
egalitarian-democratic and hierarchical-nondemocratic groups,
Study 4 included a measure of the perception of power relations
within the perpetrator group. Although members of the demo-
cratic group were considered as having more power than mem-
bers of nondemocratic groups, this effect was not qualiﬁed by
an interaction with respondents’ valorization of democracy, in-
dicating that this perceived differential did not vary as a function
of the extent to which one values democracy, contrary to retribu-
tive justice judgments (i.e., collective punishment). As a result,
perceived group member power within the group did not qualify
as a mediator of the effect evidenced through Studies 1 to 4 ac-
cording to which democratic groups are protected from collec-
tive punishment speciﬁcally among people who value
democracy. We therefore conclude that the value of democracy
relies on more than perceived power relations within the group.STUDY 5Study 5 was run in order to test a corollary of our general hy-
pothesis one might advocate for. Indeed, while Studies 1–4
tested and conﬁrmed that people who value democracy and
democratic groups would show more lenient retributive justice
judgments towards democratic groups (as compared with non-
democratic ones), another expectation we could have had is
that collective punishment of democratic groups should be re-
duced by valorization of democracy on the one hand (in order
to protect democratic values) and that collective punishment of
nondemocratic groups should be increased by valorization of
democracy on the other hand (because these groups transgress
important values). Interestingly, we found in the four previous
studies that the more people value democracy, the less they
support collective punishment of democratic offender groups,
and the more they support collective punishment of nondemo-
cratic offender groups.
Unfortunately, these simple effects do not reach signiﬁcant
levels in all studies, and Study 5 was run to provide further
evidence of this corollary. Because p-values are likely to vary
greatly around a true effect (Lai, Fidler, & Cumming, 2012), itlorization of democracy for democratic and nondemocratic offender
Offender group
Nondemocratic
nce weight Effect size Inverse variance weight
.54 19
.46 40
.42 24
.03 68
.13 68
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not emerge every time they are tested. Thus, instead of running
a supplementary study aimed at replicating these ﬁndings, we
conducted two meta-analyses (testing for these two simple
effects). Should both of these simple effects generally prove
to be signiﬁcant, this would again illustrate the central role
of democracy valorization in the effect of groups’ organization
on collective punishment.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONWe followed the procedure recommended by Lipsey and
Wilson (2001) and Hedges and Olkin (1985), using a ﬁxed-
effects model and weighting studies according to sample size.
We calculated each study’s effect size and inverse variance
weight (see Table 1), and the average effect size and the associ-
ated statistics across all studies. Results show that for democratic
offender groups, the effect of valorization of democracy was
negative, reliable and of medium size (r=.45, 95%
conﬁdence interval [CI] lower limit [LL] =.67, upper limit
[UL] =.23, SE=0.11, z=4.03, p< .001). On the opposite,
for nondemocratic offender groups, the analysis revealed a
positive, reliable and medium size effect of valorization of
democracy (r= .39, 95% CI LL= .11, UL= .67, SE=0.14,
z=2.76, p= .006). These results clearly support the idea that valo-
rization of democracy polarizes retributive judgments of demo-
cratic and nondemocratic offender groups, such that it decreases
the support for collective punishment of democratic offender
groups while increasing support for punishment of nondemo-
cratic groups. As indicated, these ﬁndings are in line with our ra-
tionale according to which the valorization of democracy shapes
retributive responses towards democratic and nondemocratic
groups, increasing both one’s leniency towards groups who up-
hold such value and one’s severity towards groups who violate it.GENERAL DISCUSSIONDemocracy has become an ideological belief system that
grants legitimacy to actions carried out by democratic groups,
whatever the moral nature of these actions may be (Falomir-
Pichastor, Staerklé et al., 2012; Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira
et al., 2012). The goal of the present research was to show that
wrongful actions perpetrated by democratic groups (as com-
pared with those of nondemocratic groups) are legitimized
through the upholding of democracy as a value, thereby pro-
viding an understanding of the underlying processes of this
relative leniency towards democratic wrongdoings in retribu-
tive justice judgments.
The results of four studies consistently showed that ob-
servers who highly valued democracy were more clement in
retributive judgments directed at democratic offender groups
as compared with nondemocratic offender groups. No such
difference was evidenced among people whose valorization
of democracy was lower. This ﬁnding was consistent across
two research paradigms, including a nondemocratic victim
group or no victim at all, and using different measures of sup-
port for collective punishment and of valorization ofCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.democracy. Taken together, these results provide consistent
support to our contention that democracy is a value that in-
fuses retributive justice judgments directed at democratic and
nondemocratic groups, granting legitimacy to wrongdoings
perpetrated by value-respecting, i.e., democratic, groups.
Wrongdoing Legitimization
One of the earliest sociological insights on social justice was that
transgressions of norms and values represent a threat to the
existing social order (Durkheim, 1893). Social psychological re-
search has empirically tested this proposition, showing that peo-
ple are motivated to restore order through the ascription of
punishments (Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004; Tyler
& Boeckmann, 1997) because punishments symbolically reaf-
ﬁrm the consensus regarding group values that have been vio-
lated by the offense (Okimoto & Wenzel, 2009). Hence, we
understand that the perception of legitimacy of a punishment,
or the support for a punishment, reﬂects the extent to which
the offense is considered a violation of those values (Darley &
Pittman, 2003; Vidmar &Miller, 1980). The present research fo-
cused on collective punishment, deﬁned as a negative treatment
inﬂicted upon an entire group for the misdeed of some of its
members (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007). This choice of a
group-level punishment is due to the fact that this research inves-
tigated the upholding of democracy as a value and that democ-
racy is necessarily a feature of groups. This is not to say that
we assume our ﬁndings to be restricted to collective punishment
judgments. We rather suggest that the value of democracy in-
fuses any justice judgment in relation with democratic and non-
democratic groups. In support for this argument, other studies
have found that support for the punishment of the group leader
closely followed the pattern of support for the collective punish-
ment of the group (Pereira et al., 2015). In order to provide a
clear answer to this question, future research should compare
different justice judgments, such as support for the offender
punishment and perceived wrongdoing legitimacy within the
same experiment to test whether the same dynamics emerge.
A boundary condition to this legitimization process was also
evidenced in the present research. Indeed, and consistent with
prior research (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2007), our ﬁndings
show that democratic offender groups were less collectively
punished than nondemocratic ones when their misdeeds
targeted a nondemocratic victim group or when no victim
was involved. Yet, such leniency was no longer observed when
the victim group was democratic as well. This reinforces the
contention that democratic groups can only beneﬁt from rela-
tively lenient justice judgments as long as their misdeeds do
not involve another group that is similarly valued: Because
democratic groups are perceived as upholding the value of
democracy, no offense perpetrated at their expense should be
tolerated, even if the perpetrator is also a democratic group.
The fact that people are less willing to tolerate victimization
of democratic groups compared with nondemocratic groups
(see also Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, et al., 2012) could illus-
trate a dehumanization process. Indeed, moral disengagement
theory (Bandura, 1999) states that depriving a person or a
group of human qualities is an effective strategy to make its
mistreatment more acceptable. Given “the power of dehumani-
zation to promote human punitiveness” (Bandura, 1999, p.Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 45, 191–203 (2015)
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nondemocratic group members not only leads to their devalu-
ation but also contributes to their dehumanization. This would
be consistent with perceptions of nondemocratic groups as be-
ing endowed with a lower moral value (Falomir-Pichastor
et al., 2007) and lacking essential qualities attributed to demo-
cratic individuals such as self-control, autonomy, self-
sufﬁciency and individual responsibility (Joffe & Staerklé,
2007; Staerklé, 2005). Future research should investigate
whether this theoretical framework is relevant to account for
the observed effects in addition to the democracy-as-value hy-
pothesis (Falomir-Pichastor, Pereira, et al., 2012).
In the Name of Democracy
The present research also contributes to the understanding of
the inﬂuence of personal values on justice judgments. While
such values have already been shown to bias procedural and
distributive justice judgments (Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle,
2009; Skitka & Mullen, 2002, 2008; Skitka, 2002), the present
research demonstrates that retributive intergroup judgments
are also affected by the perceiver’s values, in line with previ-
ous work (e.g., Feather, 1999). It would be interesting to fur-
ther investigate the different ways in which the motivation to
uphold democratic values can be expressed and how these
value protection strategies are related to speciﬁc threats to
these values. For example, according to the value protection
model (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000), be-
sides the chastisement of the transgressors, one can also react
to values transgression with a heightened willingness to en-
gage in behaviors allowing a restoration of the threatened
value. We can imagine such reactions following a threat to
the democratic values resulting in an increased motivation to
engage in democratic behaviors, such as voting or signing pe-
titions on a completely unrelated issue. Future research should
address this proposition.
Interestingly, only respondents with high levels of valo-
rization of democracy differentiated retributive judgments
as a function of the offender group’s political organization.
Given that our scale was bipolar, people with low levels of
valorization of democracy have a relatively more positive
attitude towards nondemocratic-hierarchical organizations.
Yet, these people did not protect nondemocratic offender
groups in their punishment judgments. Why is it the case?
One possibility is that individuals who have a high opinion
of democracy are more motivated to reafﬁrm and protect
this value compared with individuals who value autocratic
organizations. This asymmetry might be due to the fact that
nondemocratic values are socially disapproved and
devalued compared with democratic values, and that, there-
fore, people with positive attitudes towards nondemocratic
organizations lack sufﬁcient normative support to afﬁrm
their values. Finally, another way to look at this asymmetry
is to consider the absolute level on the response scale of re-
spondents with low levels of valorization of democracy:
They fall in the middle of the bipolar scale, suggesting that
they simply may not prefer one group organization over
another, explaining why they do not favor nondemocratic
groups in their legitimacy judgments. Future research is
needed to better understand the reasons why people withCopyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.a lower level of valorization of democracy do not display
more lenient judgments towards nondemocratic groups.
Another way to look at the present ﬁndings is that re-
spondents could have perceived the democratic offender
group as an ingroup and the nondemocratic one as an
outgroup, and that their leniency towards the former would
merely reﬂect an ingroup favoritism effect (according to the
social identity theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Although
political organization can be a categorization criterion at
the international level, in our studies, the democratic orga-
nization was a feature of speciﬁc social groups, teenagers
in Study 1 and student groups in Studies 2, 3 and 4. Previ-
ous research has furthermore shown that respondents’ iden-
tiﬁcation with the perpetrator or with the victim group was
not a mediator of the effect of political organization on le-
gitimacy judgments (Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2005). We
hence believe that offender groups’ political organizations
shape justice judgments because of people’s valorization
of, rather than identiﬁcation with, democracy.
Some limitations of the present research must nevertheless
be acknowledged. Indeed, the way democracy was considered
in these studies can be seen as somewhat limited, and our ma-
nipulation of the political organization of groups was purpose-
fully based on the two central procedural features of
democracy (namely the right to participate in the democratic
decision-making process and free leader elections). Yet, de-
mocracy cannot be reduced to this procedural deﬁnition, as
representations of democracy are more complex and encom-
pass potentially contradictory notions such as individual free-
dom, social justice, minority rights or the market economy.
In this sense, representations of democracy might not even
match a single dimension (ranging from nondemocracy to de-
mocracy) but could be more complex than that. Future re-
search should extend these results by using other potential
dimensions of democracy.
Practical Implications
To conclude, we want to underline some implications of the
present research with respect to social and international issues.
The present studies help to understand how endorsement of
democratic principles can affect and bias people’s judgments
in the context of conﬂict-ridden intergroup relations between
democratic and nondemocratic groups (see, e.g., Healy, Hoff-
man, Beer & Bourne, 2002; Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser,
1999; Mintz & Geva, 1993). In particular, our ﬁndings suggest
that armed interventions would be more easily accepted when
committed by democratic rather than nondemocratic societies
(Falomir-Pichastor et al., 2012; Falomir-Pichastor et al.,
2012), especially by people with a strongly positive and possi-
bly idealized attitude towards democracy.
Collective punishment represents a rather extreme form
of retribution because it is inﬂicted upon potentially inno-
cent group members. It is therefore intrinsically unfair.
Still, examples of such treatment abound in social life: in
schools, in the army, in sport teams or, at the level of inter-
national relations, in the case of embargos or military cam-
paigns. Thus, our research illustrates how the endorsement
of democracy can—ironically—lead people to legitimize
unfair (and anti-democratic) actions. Indeed, endorsingEur. J. Soc. Psychol. 45, 191–203 (2015)
202 Andrea Pereira et al.democratic principles had positive effects in the sense of
lowering support for collective punishment, but only for
democratic groups and not for nondemocratic ones who,
on the contrary, saw their punishment increase. Accord-
ingly, this research suggests that if people are willing to
support anti-democratic actions such as collective punish-
ment with the intention of defending democratic values, it
is possible that democracy might be strategically used as
a legitimizing tool in order to mobilize public support for
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